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TOWARD EQUAL DELIVERY OF MUNICIPAL
SERVICES IN THE CENTRAL CITIES
Kenneth W. Bond*
I. Introduction
The gradual development of equality in America may have
seemed a "providential fact"' over one hundred years ago. Indeed,
access to the American frontier guaranteed all persons an equal
opportunity to seek a better life. Further, this rural American so-
ciety, imbued with a laissez-faire socio-economic philosophy, did
not require government assistance in affording and preserving
equality of opportunity.
With the closing of the frontier, rapid industrialization after the
Civil War and the accompanying phenomenon of growth in the cen-
tral cities, urban living became inevitable for most Americans. Cor-
respondingly, the hand of government assistance has risen steadily
to help the masses crowded in the urban complex. Legislation has
been aimed at equalizing the opportunity for employment,' decent
housing,' voting,4 education,5 basic social welfare,6 and a host of
other concerns considered elemental for the fulfillment of the
"American dream."
Until recently, the courts have been slow to act affirmatively to
remedy the inequities related to enforcement of such legislation.
When the courts have intervened to insure plaintiffs' interests, their
* B.A. The Johns Hopkins University; J.D. Hastings College of the Law, University of
California. Member of the Committee on Municipal Affairs, N.Y. County Lawyers' Associa-
tion. Member of the Florida and New York Bars. Mr. Bond is associated with the firm of
Reed, McCarthy & Giordano, New York, New York.
1. A. DE ToCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 5-6 (1956).
2. E.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103,
amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -15 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (Supp. III,
1973)).
3. E.g., Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, 79 Stat. 451
(codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 20, 38, 40 42, 49 U.S.C.).
4. E.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 99-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1973 (1970)).
5. E.g., Act of Sept. 30, 1950, ch. 1124, 64 Stat. 1100 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-44
(1970), as amended, (Supp. 111, 1973)) (financial aid to local educational agencies affected
by federal activities).
6. E.g., Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-
431 (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973)).
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decisions have often been grounded on the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, providing equitable remedies where
the effect of state and local action has been to discriminate invidi-
ously against an identifiable class of persons deprived of a guaran-
teed right or important benefit generally enjoyed by society at
large.7
Municipal services has been one interest which the courts have
been slow to protect.' In Milliken v. Bradley' the Supreme Court
reversed a multi-district, area-wide court order for school desegrega-
tion for the Detroit metropolitan area because it would abrogate
local control and "disrupt and alter" the structure of public educa-
tion in Michigan. A municipal zoning ordinance which narrowly
defined the term "family," thus restricting persons who could live
together in certain neighborhoods, was sustained on the strength of
local police power in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas."' The Texas
financing scheme for public education was sustained in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez" by demonstrating that
the state law was historically responsive to wide disparities in per
student expenditures although such disparities persisted.
These cases suggest an attitude of benign complacency in the
Supreme Court, allowing it to ignore critical socio-economic prob-
lems in the central cities even though lower federal courts are clearly
focusing on these problems and the legal issues they raise." In fact,
7. E.g., Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969);
Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson,
408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
8. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961); see 2 E. McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10.33 (3d ed. 1966).
9. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
10. 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
11. 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973).
12. For example, in Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Auth., 355 F. Supp.
1257, 1260 (N.D. Ohio 1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108
(1975), the court noted:
To live in the inner city is all too often not a badge of slavery. Often it is a badge of
poverty. Far too often, indeed quite regularly in this city [Cleveland], it is a badge
or indicia of both slavery and poverty.
In Citizens Comm. for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 507 F.2d 1065, 1073 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975) (dissenting opinion), Judge Oakes pointed out that "at least
partial solutions to many of urban America's problems may be found by breaking down
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there is an increasing awareness that legislative, administrative,
and political action at the state and local level is ineffective to
remedy these problems, and that affirmative action calls for a judi-
cial solution. 3 In the area of equalizing municipal service delivery
in the central cities, there is a developing scenario which now calls
for judicial intervention under the equal protection clause.
II. A Theory of Equal Delivery of Municipal Services
It is important to note that municipal service delivery functions
differently depending on the size of the city. In small communities,
for example, delivery tends to be uniform throughout the service
area. The area is usually comprised of a homogeneous population,
all factions of which are adequately represented in the political and
administrative decisions relating to municipal services."
In the central cities, however, there exists a heterogeneous amal-
gam of separate, sometimes distinctly identifiable, demographic
elements which compete to enjoy municipal services from the same
sources. In the present condition of most metropolitan centers, those
sources are scarce as local revenues are increasingly unable to meet
the mounting cost burdens for a vast array of services. The adminis-
tration for delivering municipal services has, therefore, become sus-
ceptible to the charge that many persons in the central city are
deprived of essential services. Particularly in low-income, and racial
metropolitan income-group clustering, with the poor concentrated in certain political sub-
divisions, the 'central city.'" See generally Branfman, Cohen & Trubek, Measuring the
Invisible Wall: Land Use Controls and the Residential Patterns of the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483
(1973).
13. In Rodriguez Justice Marshall laments the Court's failure to provide a remedy:
Nor can I accept the notion that it is sufficient to remit these appellees to the vagaries
of the political process which, contrary to the majority's suggestion, has proved singu-
larly unsuited to the task of providing a remedy for this discrimination. I, for one, am
unsatisfied with the hope of an ultimate 'political' solution sometime in the indefinite
future . ..
411 U.S. at 71.
14. Greenwich, Connecticut and San Mateo, California are examples of small communi-
ties where disparities in delivery of municipal services are negligible. These municipalities
are essentially affluent, and all white. Competition between widely divergent income groups
or racial and ethnic minorities for municipal services, therefore, does not exist in any measur-
able degree. By contrast, however, small rural communities in the South may be segregated
into all-black and all-white neighborhoods, somewhat similar to demographic patterns in the
central cities, thus providing the setting for discrimination in delivery of municipal services.
See Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), reh. en banc, 461 F.2d 1171
(5th Cir. 1972); Hadnott v. City of Prattville, 309 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
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and ethnic minority neighborhoods, where there may be little or no
access to the powers controlling city-wide administration, the pro-
per setting exists for discrimination and resulting inequity in service
delivery."
Two recent cases have raised the question of whether an equal
protection claim alleging such discrimination can prevail. In Beal
v. Lindsay,1" plaintiffs sought to compel the City of New York to
maintain a park servicing a low-income minority neighborhood in
the same manner as it maintained parks in adjacent areas. In Towns
v. Beame17 plaintiffs sought to restrain the City of New York from
closing fire companies in neighborhoods predominantly inhabited
by blacks and other poor persons.
In both instances plaintiffs lost." However, rather than finally
disposing of the equal protection question, data illustrating the
demographic, social, and political conditions in the central cities
suggest that these cases and others"9 are but a prelude to a stream
of litigation calling for the development of a theory of equal delivery
of municipal services in the central cities."0
15. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has noted:
Taxable wealth and personal income are growing faster in suburban areas than in their
central cities and the disparity continues to widen. As suburbs grow, central cities, for
the most part, face the problems population loss; increasing concentrations of poor,
nonwhite and elderly; ever-increasing obsolescence in housing; and above average
crime rates.
ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CITY FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES: THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIMENSION 151 (1973).
16. 468 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1972).
17. 386 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
18. In Beal v.. Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287, 292 (2d Cir. 1972) the Second Circuit found no
discrimination against black and Hispanic residents by the defendant city in its provision of
adequate maintenance for parks. The record showed that the city had provided equal or
greater effort to maintain the parks in question, but could not achieve equal results because
of continued vandalism. In Towns v. Beame, 386 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the district
court was not persuaded by the data upon which the allegation of racial discrimination was
based and found the city to have satisfactorily rebutted the prima facie case made out by
the plaintiffs. The court found no violation of equal protection of the laws because fire
protection is not a fundamental interest and because the city's decision to close certain fire
companies was rationally related to the need for cutbacks in municipal services to solve a
budget crisis. Id. at 472-75.
19. Other cases alleging discrimination in delivery of municipal services include Goldstein
v. City of Chicago, 504 F.2d 989 (7th Cir. 1974); Davis v. Weir, 497 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1974);
United Farmworkers of Fla. Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th
Cir. 1974); Burner v. Washington, 399 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1975); Fine v. City of Winner,
352 F. Supp. 925 (D.S.D. 1972).
20. Although the current trend of court decisions is not encouraging for plaintiffs who seek
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Recent data clearly indicates that over the past fifteen years liv-
ing conditions in central city neighborhoods have deteriorated sub-
stantially as more affluent white persons have moved to the quieter,
safer, and less congested suburbs.2 Indeed, the central cities in
many instances have become densely populated ghettos for the
poor, non-white, and elderly." Should these conditions continue
unabated, the disparity in municipal service delivery could be ex-
pected to intensify.
The thrust of an equal delivery theory is to establish, with the aid
of appropriate data, the existence of one or both of two elements:
(1) an identifiable class composed of (a) racial or ethnic minority
persons, which class can be deemed suspect or (b) persons qualify-
ing as "functionally indigent" under the test for wealth as a suspect
classification enunciated by the Supreme Court in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez;3 and (2) a municipal
service, which constitutes a fundamental interest determined with
reference to a hierarchy of such services and their nexus to the
exercise of a constitutionally guaranteed right, thus conferring "con-
stitutional significance" on their delivery.
This method of financing a fundamental interest may be called
one of "intermediate flexibility." Such a method would preserve the
traditional two-tier method of judicial review, but require a court
to employ its strict scrutiny when either of the two above elements
to overcome the barriers to better living conditions in the cities, as Justice Douglas pointed
out, "the American dream teaches that if one reaches high enough and persists there is a
forum where justice is dispensed." Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct.,2197, 2215 (1975), wherein the
Supreme Court denied standing to plaintiffs to assert, inter alia, that an exclusionary zoning
ordinance denied plaintiffs access to superior municipal services.
21. Between 1960 and 1970 in 72 selected metropolitan areas throughout the United
States, each composed of a central city and outlying suburbs, forty of the central cities
experienced decreases in white population while 67 of them experienced increases in non-
white population. In 1970, central cities collectively had 42 percent more families earning less
than $3,000 per year than the suburbs. Conversely, the central cities had 20 percent fewer
families earning more than $10,000 per year than the suburbs. In 1970, the median value of
owner-occupied housing in central cities was 84 percent of that located in the suburbs. The
survey taken during that same year also showed that the crime rate in 71 central cities
exceeded that of the suburbs. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CITY
FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES: THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIMENSION 91-120 (1973).
22. In 1970, eleven percent of the population in all central cities was age 65 or older,
compared with eight percent of the population in the suburbs. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
WE THE AMERICANS: OUR CITIES AND SUBURBS 5 (1973).
23. 411 U.S. at 19 (1973).
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were established. The strict scrutiny of the court would then require
a determination of whether the allegedly discriminatory state action
is necessary to serve a legitimate governmental purpose or compel-
ling state interest.
III. Origins of the Theory: From Hawhins to Rodriguez
and Beyond
To appreciate the argument for a theory of equal delivery, it is
necessary to consider the legacy of the equal protection clause as it
has been applied in the courts to municipal services and related
subjects which deal with close urban living.
Two early Fifth Circuit cases, Hadnott v. City of Prattville24 and
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw,25 established the rule that a municipality
may not discriminate in the delivery of services to black neighbor-
hoods without acting in violation of the equal protection clause,
whether the discrimination was intentional, or merely the result of
an "arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness."26
These cases arose in small southern communities in which racial
discrimination was acute and an historic pattern had developed
where blacks and whites were separated into clearly indentifiable
classes. The lines, however, are not so precisely drawn in metropoli-
tan areas where there are usually various shadings from exclusive
white enclaves to poor minority neighborhoods. Nevertheless, these
cases are instructive as a point of origin for developing an equal
delivery theory in that they provide two basic judicial guidelines:
(1) a suspect classification based on racial discrimination in deliver-
ing municipal services will invoke a court's strict scrutiny; and (2)
a court may invoke its broad discretion in applying an equitable
plan of delivery equalization, a remedy no more extraordinary than
the judicial remedies fashioned by the courts in cases27 dealing with
related issues.
The evolution of an equal delivery theory underpinned by
Hawkins was stunted, however, by the seminal Supreme Court deci-
24. 309 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
25. 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), reh. en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972).
26. Id. at 1292, quoting Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931 (2d
Cir. 1968).
27. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 929 (2d Cir. 1968); Hobson
v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 407 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub. nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d
175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
[Vol. IV
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sion in this area. San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez" has been cited in subsequent municipal service delivery
cases for the proposition that a municipal service is not a fundamen-
tal interest" and that between classes of poor persons and minori-
ties, the badge of indigency, is not suspect. 0
Rodriguez was the terminal case in a series of actions aimed at
reforming state systems of financing public education through the
courts. Beginning in the California Supreme Court,3 plaintiffs in
several cases developed a novel theory of equal protection in which
"district wealth"32 could be classified as suspect and public educa-
tion raised to the level of a fundamental interest. Both notions were
rejected by the Supreme Court. In applying the rational relation test
to validate the Texas legislation, the Court put an end to any hope
that the judiciary could be called upon to provide easy remedies to
untangle the inequities of bureaucratic social and economic systems
in the central cities.
Because Rodriguez, an education case, has been construed to
limit the scope of applying equal protection analysis to inequities
in municipal service delivery generally, it is appropriate to discuss
a theory of equal delivery partially in terms of the Supreme Court's
opinion. Moreover, because there have been few cases directly con-
cerned with the delivery of municipal services, other recent deci-
28. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
29. The following municipal services and other rights have been held not to be fundamen-
tal interests: garbage collection, Goldstein v. City of Chicago, 504 F.2d 989, 991 (7th Cir.
1974); annexation in order to attain adequate municipal services, Wilkerson v. City of Coral-
Ville, 478 F.2d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 1973); healthful environment for commercial and residential
units, Pinkney v. Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, 375 F. Supp. 305, 310 (N.D. Ohio
1974); fire protection, Towns v. Beame, 386 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
30. Citizens Comm. for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 507 F.2d 1065, 1068 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 253 (9th
Cir. 1974); Brown v. Board of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 110, 122-23 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Amen v. City
of Dearborn, 363 F. Supp. 1267, 1281 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
31. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
32. The concept of "district wealth," as opposed to "personal income wealth," was devel-
oped under the principal of "fiscal neutrality" wherein disparities in classifications of as-
sessed valuation of property between school districts could render the property wealth of a
particular district suspect. See generally Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportun-
ity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 305,
384-86 (1969). District wealth had been held to be a suspect classification in Rodriguez v. San
Antonio Indep. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 283 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev 'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 875-76 (D. Minn. 1971); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.
3d 584, 591, 487 P.2d 1247, 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 612 (1971).
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sions regarding equal protection claims involving annexation, 3 resi-
dential zoning restrictions,34 and housing project site selection and
construction" contribute to the development of the theory.3 -
A. Indigency in the Central City: A Suspect Classification
It is clear that once discrimination in delivery based on race is
demonstrated, the court will employ the strict scrutiny test;37 but
limiting suspect classifications to race would severely limit the ap-
plication of a theory of equal delivery. Within the central city, race
is not the only badge of discrimination. 8 To some extent certainly,
33. Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974); Wilkerson v.
City of Coralville, 478 F.2d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 1973).
34. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U'S. 1
(1974); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970); Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369
F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated, 510 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1975).
35. Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144
(1974); United Farmworkers of Fla. Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d
799 (5th Cir. 1974); Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo, 380 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Ohio
1974).
36. These cases are important to consider in a theory of equal delivery because they
concern allowing persons to relocate to urban neighborhoods where there may be superior
municipal service delivery. If improved delivery cannot be accomplished at the situs where
its effect is discriminatory, persons deprived of such delivery have only one other alternative
to alleviate the discrimination, which is to move out of the affected neighborhood and into a
better one. However, because indigent and ethnic and racial minority persons are often locked
into deteriorating central-city areas, the lowering of relocation barriers by allowing annexa-
tion, less restrictive zoning, and scattered-site housing provide an alternative remedy to
equitable relief which may be granted under an equal protection claim.
37. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), reh. en banc, 461 F.2d 1171
(5th Cir. 1972).
38. The correlation between race and indigency has been recognized in the central city in
several cases related to the delivery of municipal services. See Ybarra v. City of Town of Los
Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 253 (9th Cir. 1974); Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing
Auth., 500 F.2d 1087, 1093 (6th Cir. 1974); United Farmworkers of Fla. Housing Project, Inc.
v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 808 (5th Cir. 1974); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d
1037, 1039 (10th Cir. 1970); Brown v. Board of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 110, 122-24 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
But not all indigent persons fall into discreet classes of racial and ethnic minorities. For
example, although in 1973, 28 percent of all black families fell below the low-income level
($3,000 annually) compared to only seven percent of all white families, there were twice as
many poor white families as black families in the central city in terms of absolute numbers.
See SOCIAL & ECONOMIC STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
STATUS OF THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1973, at 28. Thus, to attempt reaching
persons affected by disparities in municipal services delivery through the equal protection
clause with race as the only suspect classification aims wide of the mark in constructing a
general theory of equal delivery. See Burner v. Washington, 399 F. Supp. 44, 48 (1975),
wherein the court acknowledged there may be "other suspect classifications" besides race
which suffer inequities in municipal service delivery.
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"district wealth" defines a class of persons discriminated against.
But the Supreme Court has pointed out in Rodriguez that the mea-
surement of the class in terms of district wealth defies sufficiently
clear identification because it expresses the indicia of discrimina-
tion in terms of comparative deprivation rather than absolute depri-
vation.39 The type of wealth discrimination in the central city which
could be labeled as suspect in the appropriate case is personal
income poverty, sometimes referred to in the cases as "functional
indigbncy."
To determine what level of indigency becomes functional and
therefore suspect, the Rodriguez case enunciated a two-step test.4 0
First, when the class' impecunity renders it completely unable to
pay for some desired benefit and second, when the class conse-
quently sustains an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportun-
ity to enjoy that benefit.4
In support of this test, the Supreme Court noted cases in which
the plaintiffs were unable to pay a fee which was a condition preced-
ent to enjoying an important benefit, such as having a transcript for
use in an appeal,42 having counsel appointed on appeal,4" and having
access to being placed in a ballot in a state election.44
It follows from the Rodriguez test that where indigency creates
hardship but not an insurmountable barrier to enjoyment of desired
benefits, such comparative indigency will not qualify as suspect.
The Supreme Court refused to draw a fine line of comparative indi-
gency for purposes of defining the class in traditional terms.45 Thus,
in Rodriguez, none of the plaintiffs were discretely cordoned off from
the school grounds. All received some degree of education which the
Court deemed "adequate" whether they resided in poor or rich dis-
tricts in terms of the assessed valuation of taxable property.6
The distinction, however, between education which is not quanti-
fiable in any traditional measurement, and municipal services
which are quantifiable in terms of their delivery, is not an insignifi-
39. 411 U.S. at 19.
40. Id. at 19-20.
41. Id. at 20.
42. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
43. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
44. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
45. 411 U.S. at 22-25.
46. 411 U.S. at 24.
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cant difference. The Rodriguez plaintiffs were not litigating the
total absence of education, but rather the qualitative difference in
their education, viewed against other more affluent school districts,
measured in terms of a financing scheme. Because the delivery of
basic municipal services is more quantifiable than "educational
quality," the Rodriguez test for finding a suspect wealth classifica-
tion is more easily met.
As the district court pointed out in the case of Brown v. Board of
Education,47 this test could be met by showing discrimination di-
rected toward poor persons whose incomes fell below some identifia-
ble level of poverty. Credible statistics, however, would have to
demonstrate that persons whose annual incomes fall, for example,
below the $3,000 poverty level are grouped together in deteriorating
neighborhoods of the central cities, regardless of racial or ethnic
considerations. Further, the statistics would have to show that these
persons are unable to pay for the use of public transportation, water,
sewerage, utilities, and other services financed through the payment
of a fee or periodic charges, or that they cannot pay property assess-
ments or incremental rent increases reflecting assessments for street
paving, street lighting, sewers, traffic control apparatus, or similarly
financed services. 48
The difficulty, however, arises in the absolute deprivation of de-
livery to the functionally indigent because of and notwithstanding
their inability to pay for services. This problem was illustrated in
the case of Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills." The Ninth
Circuit admitted that a minimum lot size zoning ordinance pre-
cluded poor persons from living in Los Altos Hills and from enjoying
its municipal services. This fact met the first step of the Rodriguez
test for finding the wealth classification suspect. However, the court
47. 386 F. Supp. 110, 122 (N.D. I1. 1974).
48. Defining "inability to pay for municipal services" is subject to many interpretations.
It could mean simply that a person has no funds whatever to pay for municipal services.
However, this situation would arise rarely. A more plausiable definition would be to compare
municipal service payments to total spendable funds. If payment for such services repre-
sented a prohibitively high proportion of spendable funds and also required allocating funds
set aside to pay for food, health care, and other necessaries to be used for municipal service
payments, then it could be argued that plaintiffs' poverty renders them functionally unable
to pay for municipal services lest they forego essential items. Refined statistical data will be
needed to make this argument.
49. 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
[Vol. IV
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pointed out that since plaintiffs did not prove that low-income hous-
ing was unavailable in the same county, they had not sustained the
proof of absolute deprivation. 0 Thus, the second step of Rodriquez
was never met.
The Ybarra case is distinguishable from the typical situation in
the central cities. In Ybarra, plaintiffs were attempting to break into
a white, high-income community in a largely surburban county
within the San Jose metropolitan area. In the densely populated
inner cities, however, indigent persons locked into deteriorating
neighborhoods lack any real opportunity to relocate.5
With an immobile and identifiable class of functionally indigent
persons, lacking any meaningful local options, the stage is set to
satisfy the second step of the Rodriguez test. The payment required
for delivery of municipal services may be so far beyond the means
of persons in certain neighborhoods that such services are effectively
placed outside their reach. If no alternatives exist, there may be an
absolute deprivation of whatever services the city or special district
may provide. Indeed this form of deprivation seems no less severe
or absolute than that suffered by plaintiffs in Griffin v. Illinois"2 and
Douglas v. California,53 where the Supreme Court found a suspect
wealth classification with reference to personal income levels.
A second form of absolute deprivation could occur if there is no
delivery at all of a particular municipal service. The municipality
may ignore or simply neglect to maintain municipal services in a
deteriorating neighborbood inhabited by an identifiable class of in-
digent persons. 4 The second step of the Rodriguez test for the sus-
50. Id. at 254.
51. Justice White, in his dissenting opinion in Rodriguez, pointed out that there were no
local options among persons who lack the economic capacity to purchase better services, in
that case, public education. 411 U.S. at 64-67. For example, in 1970, over 30 percent of all
suburban owner-occupied housing was valued at more than $25,000; less than 20 percent of
all owner-occupied housing was so valued in the central cities. This proves that "a considera-
ble part of [the suburban] housing market is most definitely beyond the reach of lower and
lower-middle income families." ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
CITY FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES: THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIMENSION (1973).
52. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
53. 372 U.S. 353 (1973).
54. Cf. Davis v. Weir, 497 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1974). In Davis the plaintiff's water service
was terminated pursuant to a municipal ordinance requiring a prior tenant's arrears for water
charges be paid by the new tenant before water service could be supplied. While the court
ruled that the ordinance failed the rational relation test, id. at 144-45, the facts indicated
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pectness of wealth, i.e., absolute deprivation, would be satisfied and
the court's strict scrutiny could be properly invoked. It should be
noted, however, that the municipality's failure to maintain services
in one neighborhood at the same level as in another may not meet
the "absolute deprivation" requirement of the second step in the
Rodriguez test. If some delivery of services which can be deemed
adequate is provided, the deprivation may be merely comparative.55
In that instance, given the Court's traditional leniency toward acts
of local discretion, the municipality's conduct would usually satisfy
the rational relation test on the grounds that determining the level
of adequacy in delivery of municipal services is a legislative rather
than a judicial function."
B. Municipal Services as a Fundamental Interest
The Rodriguez case left open the question of what constitutes
"adequate" delivery. That question is one of fact which will depend
on the circumstances in each case. However, in defining the "ade-
quacy" of delivery of any given municipal service a court may con-
sider the effect of such delivery on the plaintiffs' ability to exercise
a related constitutionally guaranteed right.
Recent cases have established a general rule that there is no fun-
damental right to the delivery of municipal services and that such
services are not fundamental interests for the purposes of equal
protection analysis. Courts have held that there is no fundamental
right to education,57 garbage collection," fire protection,59 and an-
that defective plumbing which the city of Atlanta failed to repair, caused the arrearages to
be exorbitant. Id. at 141. These facts suggest that the city's failure to make repairs was a
cause of the plaintiff's inability to enjoy water service. However, the case did not reach the
question of whether repairs were ignored because of plaintiff's indigency.
55. The Rodriguez case holds that a showing of only comparative deprivation is not
enough to prove invidious discrimination in providing public education. 411 U.S. at 22-25.
As long as a municipality delivers some services to all neighborhoods it would be difficult to
argue that "absolute deprivation" has occurred. Thus, since Texas provided an "adequate"
education for all students, there was no evidence of wealth discrimination in traditional
terms. See Burner v. Washington, 399 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1975) wherein the court pointed
out that the data relied upon by the plaintiffs and defendants at most demonstrated insignifi-
cant inequities in service delivery.
56. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
57. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
58. Goldstein v. City of Chicago, 504 F.2d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 1974).
59. Towns v. Beame, 386 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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nexation to obtain better municipal services."0
These cases represent a withdrawal from the earlier direction of
the Warren Court which created fundamental interests without spe-
cific authority from the Constitution where the interest in question
was found colored with constitutional significance." In Rodriguez,
the Supreme Court said that it would not create substantive consti-
tutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws." Yet, in defending its decision in Shapiro v. Thompson,3 the
Supreme Court stated simply that the right to interstate travel had
long been recognized as a right of "constitutional significance.""4 In
fact, as Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissenting opinion in
Rodriguez, the Supreme Court has often created fundamental inter-
ests in view of their "constitutional significance." 5
The Rodriguez decision, therefore, signals the more restrictive
direction in which the Supreme Court has been moving in recogniz-
ing fundamental interests; indeed, the narrow test remains the over-
riding barrier to be overcome in demonstrating the fundamental
interests in an equal delivery claim. What the Rodriguez Court
feared in raising education to the status of a fundamental interest
was the Court's becoming a "super-legislature" wherein it may be
asked in subsequent cases to pick and choose which municipal serv-
ices were fundamental interests through an ad hoc determination
with reference to their social or economic importance."0
While considerations of social and economic notions are impor-
tant for arguing that indigency is a suspect classification, such no-
tions will fail to establish a fundamental interest and fail to merit
a court's strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court has clearly indicated
that the thrust of the fundamental interest argument must proceed
along a narrower line of demonstrating a nexus between the delivery
of a municipal service and the exercise of a constitutionally guaran-
teed right. 7
60. Wilkerson v. City of Coralville, 478 F.2d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 1973).
61. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy); Dunn v. Blumatein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate
travel).
62. 411 U.S. at 33.
63. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
64. 411 U.S. at 32.
65. Id. at 98-103 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 32. See also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
67. Arguing that municipal service delivery may affect the exercise of a constitutional
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Recent cases have been concerned with the effect of state action
on the right to freedom of association and privacy protected under
the first amendment 8 and the right to vote. 9 Following this line of
cases, the deprivation of municipal service delivery may lend itself
well to an argument that municipal services are essential to the
ability to exercise such 'constitutional rights. When plaintiffs in
Rodriguez asserted this argument with regard to education, the
Supreme Court answered that it never "presumed to possess either
the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most
effective speech or the most informed electoral choice."7 In other
words, deprivation of education does not affect the right to speak
or vote, but only its relative quality. The deprivation of municipal
services, however, is not a qualitative notion, but deals with the
quantitative issue of adequate delivery.7'
Thus, the Rodriguez decision leaves open the question of whether
municipal services may be considered as a fundamental interest if
right is not a mere pretext to circumventing the difficulty in convincing a court of such
delivery's fundamentality in terms of its social and economic impact. Rather, this argument
acknowledges that the social and economic conditions in the central city, to which a depriva-
tion of municipal service delivery may contribute, have reached such severe levels that they
cause an infringement on constitutional rights and not merely hardship and inconvenience.
68. Recent cases indicate an expanding awareness by the Supreme Court that state action
can infringe on rights guaranteed by the first amendment. In United States Dep't. of Agricul-
ture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538-45 (1974) Justice Douglas' concurring opinion pointed out
that the right to join a household was protected by the first amendment and that where this
freedom of association was infringed upon by restrictions in amendments to the Food Stamp
Act, such amendments violated the equal protection of the laws. Similarly, Justice Douglas
argued in his dissenting opinion in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 81-82 (1973) that forcible
detainer laws violate a right of privacy since the home-whether rented or owned-is the very
heart of privacy in modern America. Likewise, Justice Marshall, dissenting in Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1974), pointed out that local power to enact zoning
ordinances cannot infringe on the fundamental rights of association and privacy, including
modes of association that pertain to social and economic benefits. See also Police Dep't. v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
69. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
70. 411 U.S. at 36.
71. Municipal service delivery can be measured in terms of the input which comprises a
particular municipal service, i.e., number of police patrolmen per city block or number of fire
calls per day per neighborhood. This is the approach taken in Burner v. Washington, 399 F.
Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1975) and Beal v. Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1972). Alternatively, a
court could measure delivery in terms of the results of effort, i.e., number of arrests and
convictions or the number of fires contained. By either measure, it seems clear that equal
protection of the laws can be satisfied through applying a prospective standard of equal
delivery which limits its inquiry to a quantitative measurement.
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they significantly affect the exercise of constitutional rights.72 In
municipal service delivery cases, whenever the insufficiency of de-
livery causes a significant denial of the exercise of a constitutional
right, that nexus lifts the municipal services themselves to the level
of a fundamental interest.
In cases where the fundamental interest argument was denied,
plaintiffs have not focused on the nexus between the municipal
service and an affected constitutional right.73 As a result, local acts
have'been sanctioned as rationally related to a governmental inter-
est because of the long-standing maxim that it is within the discre-
tion of the local legislative function to determine the societal signifi-
cance of municipal services. However, once municipal service deliv-
ery is cast in the light of affecting constitutional rights, such abuse
of discretion may violate the equal protection clause.
In any determination of whether a failure of municipal service
delivery may deny the exercise of a constitutional right, the issue is
best viewed in terms of a hierarchy of services. Essential services
such as police patrol and water supply would be placed at the top
of the list, with amenities74 such as parks and recreational services
at the bottom. Moreover, if delivery of municipal services were in-
volved, their aggregate effect on the exercise of constitutional rights
would correspondingly adjust their position within the hierarchy."
Establishing a hierarchy of municipal services serves a useful pur-
72. To illustrate this point, consider the effect of education as opposed to water and
sanitation service on first amendment rights. A poor education does not deny the right to
privacy or association. Its infringements on these rights is, at best, very remote. But little or
no water service, sewerage, and garbage collection can render an entire neighborhood unfit
for habitation, create a health hazard, and, in effect, evict the inhabitants and deny their
rights to privacy and association.
73. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Goldstein v. City
of Chicago, 504 F.2d 989 (7th Cir. 1974); Wilkerson v. City of Coralville, 478 F.2d 709 (8th
Cir. 1973); Beal v. Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1972). With the possible exception of
Rodriguez, these cases all based their arguments of fundamentality on social and economic
considerations of municipal services.
74. See Comment, The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education, Municipal Services
and Wealth, 7 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS Civ. LIS. L. REV. 103, 163 (1972).
75. In United Farmworkers of Fla. Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d
799 (5th Cir. 1974) both water and sewerage were denied to plaintiffs who constructed a low-
income housing project within the service boundaries of the municipality. Although the case
was decided for plaintiffs on the basis of racial discrimination, the court recognized that
denial of water and sewerage created a health hazard, id. at 809, which would place these
municipal services in a high position within the hierarchy.
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pose for equal protection analysis because it would provide the
courts with a judicially manageable standard for testing the exist-
ence of a fundamental interest. The higher a particular municipal
service was positioned within the hierarchy, the more likely depriva-
tion of its delivery could be expected to affect a constitutional inter-
est, thereby conferring constitutional significance.
Of course, plaintiffs would bear the burden of demonstrating the
nexus between municipal service delivery and a constitutional right.
But unlike the Rodriguez case, where plaintiffs' statistics failed to
prove that the quality of education was materially affected by tax
revenues or that education, per se, had a significant or even a mea-
sureable nexus to the exercise of a constitutional right,"6 municipal
service delivery can be statistically measured from the facts in each
case which are subject to traditional judicial review. The hierarchy
of municipal service would serve as an analytic tool to guide the
court in understanding the significance of a particular municipal
service, from which it would in turn determine the nexus between
the service and the exercise of a constitutional right.
The hierarchy and nexus analysis together provide a flexible test
for determining the fundamentality of a particular municipal serv-
ice or aggregate of services in the appropriate case." This analysis
may ultimately lead a court to establish a general rule for a mini-
mum level of delivery which must be achieved to preclude the
court's intervention with an equitable remedy.
76. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 15 (1973). There was only
a partial correlation between median family income and revenue per student expenditures.
Thus, the Court had insufficient data with which to measure the effect of education on the
exercise of constitutionally guaranteed rights.
77. The Rodriguez case also left open the question of what would be an "implied" consti-
tutional right, and thus a fundamental interest. The Court provided no guidelines for deter-
mining when such a right may be implied. However, this may be an area where social science
and economic data will convince a court of the fundamentality of a municipality service
without laboring through the "nexus" analysis. One commentator has suggested that the
following data may be useful to demonstrate an implied constitutional right: (1) the present
inequities are not the result of happenstance, but are part of a history of deliberate or
negligent economic segregation; (2) the poor are politically impotent to force the legislative
and administrative powers to act in their behalf; (3) there is a stigma of living in urban
poverty which results in an effective boycott by governmental sources; (4) there is no mobility
from the central cities. See Trachtenberg, Reforming School Finance Through State Consti-
tutions: Robinson v. Cahill Points the Way, 27 RuTGERs L. REV. 365, 376-77 (1974).
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IV. Toward a Flexible Standard of Judicial Review:
The Intermediate Method
Thus far the standards of judicial scrutiny in determining
whether there has been a violation of equal protection of the laws
have been discussed in terms of the two traditional tests of judicial
review: strict scrutiny or rational relation." However, such neat
categorization has been criticized as too severe in practical applica-
tion, allowing glaring disparities in legislative schemes to pass un-
touched through equal protection analysis. The current posture of
such analysis allows acts of local discretion which may substantially
deprive central city residents of essential services to withstand judi-
cial review because such acts bear some rational relation to a gov-
ernmental interest.
To develop a more flexible standard of judicial review, some cases
have looked to the legislative means to examine their rationality to
a legitimate governmental purpose. 0 Such an approach allows the
court to employ variations in degree of care in scrutinizing discrimi-
nation without the necessity of first finding the existence of a sus-
pect classification or a fundamental interest. Thus, in one case in-
volving the discriminatory effects of a zoning ordinance, the judge
stated that he was to consider (1) the nature of the unequal classifi-
cation, (2) the nature of the adversely affected rights, and (3) the
governmental interest urged in support of the classification to deter-
mine the rationality of the ordinance."'
This approach to relaxing the rigid test of strict scrutiny has been
78. The operation of the two tests of judicial review is crucial to the outcome of equal
protection cases. If a fundamental interest or suspect classification is found to exist, the
governmental entity whose action is allegedly discriminatory against a discernible group
bears the burden of proving that such action is necessary to promote a compelling state
interest. Hence the court employs its strict scrutiny and in most cases the governmental
entity has failed to meet this heavy burden. If, on the other hand, no fundamental interest is
found to be infringed upon or if the classification scheme is not found to be suspect, then the
governmental action is presumably valid and the state need only show its classification has
some rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. Under this test it is much easier for
the state t6 justify differential treatment and more difficult to strike down such treatment
on equal protection grounds.
79. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
80. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1972).
81. Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456, 465 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated, 510 F.2d 976
(7th Cir. 1975).
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partially abandoned by the Supreme Court. For example, the
Rodriquez case puts to rest any notions that the degree of care the
courts will employ in scrutinizing alleged discrimination may vary
with the affected interest's societal or economic importance. Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraass2 puts the same notion to rest in the instance
of zoning ordinances.
The difficulty the courts have experienced in applying this "mod-
est interventionist approach," as Professor Gunther has termed it,"
is that by discarding the preliminary requirement of first finding a
suspect classification or fundamental interest, the burden is effec-
tively shifted to the state to come forward with evidence of the
rationality of its action. Thus, the traditional presumption of legis-
lative validity in the rational relation test would be weakened, and,
depending on rather informal and imprecise assertions of the social
and economic impact of discrimination on the class affected, a pre-
sumption of legislative invalidity could arise. In practice a court
could produce the same result that the strict scrutiny test would
render without ever having met any of its preliminary requirements.
If adopted, this approach to relaxing the tests for judicial review
would indeed have granted a legislative license to the courts.
Courts have sustained discriminatory state action affecting socio-
economic interests as rationally related to a governmental interest
precisely because such interests are generally remote from constitu-
tional guarantees."4 For example, it is accepted that where wealth
classifications are involved, the courts have never required mathe-
matically precise distribution or precisely equal advantage to satisfy
equal protection of the laws.5 However, as Justice Marshall pointed
out in his Rodriquez dissent, "the situation differs markedly when
discrimination against important individual interests with constitu-
tional implications and against particularly disadvantaged or pow-
erless classes is involved.""6
That "different situation" can be found in the area of municipal
82. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
83. Gunther, supra note 80, at 24.
84. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
85. See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S.
487 (1963); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas. Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
86. 411 U.S. at 109.
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service delivery. As this Article has suggested, the gravity of depriv-
ing a segment of central city residents of essential municipal serv-
ices goes far beyond mere social and economic inconvenience. 7
The focus in creating a flexible method of judicial review in the
area of municipal services delivery should not be directed at the
rationality end of the spectrum, but rather at the fundamentality
of municipal services in order to apply the strict scrutiny test. In
this perspective, a preliminary spectrum of judicial review which
exanmines the nexus between municipal services delivery and consti-
tutional rights would provide the necessary flexibility to apply equal
protection analysis realistically in determining whether the strict
scrutiny test can fashion an equitable remedy. By constructing a
hierarchy of municipal services the traditional two-test method of
judicial review remains intact because the court would first evaluate
the nexus between the municipal service and the constitutional
right. Where the nexus is found to be strong enough, the municipal
service would become a fundamental interest because of its "consti-
tutional significance." Once the fundamental interest was estab-
lished, the court could employ its strict scrutiny test in the usual
manner.
This approach to judicial review does not require the courts to
employ the "means scrutiny" method of flexibility which perverts
the presumption of legislative validity of the rational relation test.
Yet it does not put the strict scrutiny test out of reach to render an
equitable remedy in the appropriate case because the court would
have available a flexible method of determining when a municipal
service becomes a fundamental interest. Thus, this "intermediate
method"8 creates no more substantive rights under the equal pro-
87. Although the Court in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1974) rejected
the argument that the zoning ordinance infringed upon first amendment rights, the case was
decided largely on the validity of the police power and local discretion to zone established
under Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion
in the Belle Terre case suggests that reversal should have been based on the mootness of the
action since the plaintiffs had moved from the neighborhood and therefore no longer had an
associational or economic interest to be vindicated by invalidating the zoning ordinance. 416
U.S. at 10.
88. The intermediate method is expressed in part by Justice Marshall in his dissenting
opinion in Rodriguez: "As the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the
nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more funda-
mental .... " 411 U.S. at 102-03. However, it stops short of Justice Marshall's further
proposition that "the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a
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tection clause than the opinions in those cases which elevated the
right to a transcript on appeal, or the right to vote, or the right of
privacy to the status of fundamental interests.
V. Applying the Theory of Equal Delivery
A. Realistic Goals
The theory of equal delivery proposed in this Article should in no
sense be construed as an attempt at equalizing municipal service
delivery throughout a metropolitan region. That kind of wide-
ranging reform is still the proper province of the legislature. Rather,
the theory is aimed at assisting the indigent, racial, and ethnic
minorities rooted in the central cities who, but for recourse to litiga-
tion, lack the power to gain effective remedies through the normal
channels of access to local and state government.
As this Article is being written, the author acknowledges that
there is little available data which can be brought before a court to
make the arguments presented herein come to life. 9 There is clearly
much work to be done by statisticians and social and political scien-
tists to build the evidence which will prove the equal protection
claim. The recent municipal service delivery cases which have fol-
lowed Rodriquez clearly indicate that casual assertions of discrimi-
nation without weighty statistical proof of actual injury will not
prevail. However, some of the general data presents a clear picture
discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly." Id. at 103. Under the intermediate
method the "adjustment" comes at the point of recognizing the municipal service to be a
fundamental interest, and the "infringement" is on the constitutional guarantee due to the
disparity in delivery of the municipal service which therefore renders it to be of constitutional
significance.
89. Some pioneering efforts to collect data which measure municipal service delivery
include a series of working papers prepared by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public
Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York. See D. Phares & E. Morley, The Measure-
ment of Public Sector Activity in New York City with Reference to Health and Hospital
Service (1973); D. Phares & E. Morley, The Measurement of Public Sector Output in New
York City with Reference to Sanitation, (1973). The Urban Institute, Washington, D.C.. has
also published a series of papers involving case studies of particular cities. See P. Block,
Equality of Distribution of Police Services-A Case Study of Washington, D.C. (1974); D.
Fisk & C. Lancer, Equality of Distribution of Recreation Services-A Case Study of Washing-
ton, D.C. (1974). These two papers were employed by the court in Burner v. Washington, 399
F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1975) to adjudicate plaintiff's claims. Efforts to collect and analyze data
measuring municipal services delivery is also being conducted by the Lawyer's Committee
for Civil Rights Under the Law, Washington, D.C. Telephone interview with David C. Long,
Esq., member of the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law, Washington, D.C.,
Aug. 15, 1975.
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of decay in the central cities. What is needed now is to continue
probing deeper to uncover new data which will identify those central
city neighborhoods possessing the characteristics required to argue
the theory of equal delivery successfully.
Unlike the school finance reform cases, in particular Rodriguez,
the theory of equal delivery does not probe beyond the data of mu-
nicipal service delivery to evaluate the effect of certain inputs, such
as financing, on such delivery. In this respect, the statistical correla-
tions between race or wealth and delivery are subject to direct com-
parison to argue the theory without the handicap experienced by the
school finance reformers of having to compare financing (input) to
race or wealth and then back to service delivery (output), i.e., edu-
cational quality. Of course, the nexus between delivery and the
exercise of a constitutional right may be subject to proof by direct
correlation as well. But, with the proper data, the nexus can be
demonstrated by direct comparison between two sets of statistics.
B. Remedies
In the usual case contemplated by the theory, plaintiffs would
request the court's exercise of ordinary equity powers. The order
would be directed to a municipal officer, enjoining him from delay-
ing in taking action to provide the denied service, or ordering him
to take the appropriate action requested by the plaintiffs. This type
of "stop and go" relief is the most rudimentary form of equitable
relief and should be an adequate remedy in most instances.
Where the deprivation of delivery is so severe that simple equita-
ble relief is inadequate, a broader, more sophisticated remedy is
available whereby the court could order the municipality to enact
a plan of equal delivery over which the court would retain supervi-
sory jurisdiction. However, such a plan can be enforced against a
municipality only if the action is brought on a claim of violation of
the equal protection clause.' If the action is brought on a claim of
class discrimination under a federal civil rights statute, it has been
held that there is no subject matter jurisdiction over the municipal-
ity, thus precluding this broader remedy. 2
90. See Burner v. Washington, 399 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1975).
91. -.In Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), reh. en banc, 461 F.2d
1171 (5th Cir.' 1972) the action was brought on equal protection grounds and a plan of
equalization was implemented.
..92. If the action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) alleging a civil rights violation,
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C. Regional Discrimination
An additional problem in applying the theory would arise where
there may be discriminatory delivery which crosses municipal cor-
porate boundary lines. For example, a regional special district may
supply water to an area within the corporate limits of two munici-
palities where the discrimination is alleged to exist. The Supreme
Court decision in Milliken v. Bradley93 leaves little doubt that the
courts will not impose an equitable remedy across local district
boundaries if some remedy within a district is feasible. This policy
is in keeping with the judicial heritage of respecting the integrity of
local jurisdictional boundaries. As long as the plaintiffs' request for
relief is limited to simple equitable orders, the plaintiffs need only
name the proper defendant to avoid involving a particular munici-
pality with delivering services beyond its own boundaries."4 How-
ever, if the area for which the municipal service is provided crosses
the boundary lines of several communities, the most effective rem-
edy for discriminatory delivery of such services may require an in-
terdistrict solution. The situation may call for separate suits against
each service district rather than one consolidated claim against the
municipality unless, distingushing Milliken, no remedy within a
district is possible and the only recourse to an equitable remedy
would be an interdistrict remedy.5 The validity of Justice Douglas'
comment in his dissenting opinion in Milliken (that the Supreme
Court would have no difficulty in affirming an interdistrict remedy
then the municipality, will not be a "person" for purposes of having personal jurisdiction for
the court to order an equitable remedy. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
Likewise, without such personal jurisdiction, a court may not order the municipality to draft
a plan of equalization. See Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Auth., 500 F.2d 1087
(6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975).
93. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
94. In United Farmworkers of Fla. Housing Project v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799
(5th Cir. 1974) the municipality was ordered to provide water and sewerage beyond its corpo-
rate boundaries, but within an area which it had previously contracted to extend its water
service and sewer system.
95. In Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 381 (1975) (mem.),
the court found that segregated schools in the Wilmington School District of Delaware re-
sulted from an historic pattern of inter-district segregation within New Castle County, includ-
ing state involvement in inter-district segregation. The court distinguished the decision in
Milliken, which ordered the parties in that case to submit alternative Wilmington-only and
inter-district plans to eliminate segregation. Id. at 432.
[Vol. IV
19761 EQUAL DELIVERY OF MUNICIPAL SERVICES 285
to provide equal sewers, rather than equal educational opportuni-
ties)9" remains to be seen.
D. Mootness
A further problem in applying the theory involves dismissals for
mootness on a showing by the defendant that remedial action is
underway to alleviate the alleged discrimination. Several actions
have been dismissed on the strength of this defense. 7 This is a
disturbing development because efforts of good faith do not neces-
sarily satisfy equal protection of the laws. The discrimination the
equal protection clause is intended to remedy includes patterns of
deprivation which persist despite such efforts.
The problem imposed by the mootness defense is that it provides
an attractive pretext for a court to embrace in dismissing the action
rather than undertake the difficult and sometimes frustrating task
of scrutinizing the evidence to determine if a justiciable equal pro-
tection claim is present;99 and if so, whether the defendant's reme-
dial action will alleviate the discrimination. Admittedly, there are
few guidelines for a court to follow in examining the merits of an
equal protection claim in a municipal service delivery case. In this
respect, perhaps a theory of equal delivery may be helpful.
96. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 758 (1974).
97. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 110, 126 (N.D. I1. 1974); Fire v. City of
Winner, 352 F. Supp. 925, 928 (D.S.D. 1972); cf. Burner v. Washington, 399 F. Supp. 44, 51
(D.D.C. 1975).
98. As Justice Marshall put it in his dissenting opinion in Rodriguez:
[Tihis Court has never suggested that because some 'adequate' level of benefits is
provided to all, discrimination in provision of services is therefore constitutionally
excusable. The Equal Protection Clause is not addressed to the minimal sufficiency
but rather to the unjustifiable inequalities of state action.
411 U.S. at 89. But in Fire v. Winner, 352 F. Supp. 925, 928 (D.S.D. 1972), the court said:
"[W]hen a city recognizes a disparity in providing services to its residents and makes a good
faith effort to correct such disparity . . . then the municipality has met its constitutional
responsibility." The district court's statement is based on the validity of local control and
mere rationality.
99. Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct.
2197 (1975) that dismissal for lack of standing can also be such a pretext:
I can appreciate the Court's reluctance to adjudicate the complex and difficult legal
questions involved in determining the constitutionality of practices which assertedly
limit residence in a particular municipality to those who are white and relatively well-
off, and I also understand that the merits of this case could involve grave sociological
and political ramifications. But courts cannot refuse to hear a case on the merits
merely because they would prefer not to . . ..
Id. at 2216.
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E. Exposing the Fiction of Local Control
A valuable dividend from the development of an equal delivery
theory would be to destroy the myth of local control. In numerous
cases the privileged position of city administrators, land use plan-
ners, city councils, and state legislatures has allowed gross inequi-
ties to stand unaltered. That these inequities are societal and eco-
nomic in nature does not mean that they may not also significantly
infringe upon the exercise of constitutional rights. In such cases, the
defense of local control must be removed as a permanent barrier to
effecting an equitable remedy.
In small communities the theory of equal delivery would be in-
applicable because the result of local discretion does not produce
the kind of discrimination in municipal service delivery which the
theory addresses. The obvious exception is where racial discrimina-
tion exists, as in the case of Hawkins v. Town of Shaw'0° and
Hadnott v. City of Prattsville.'1' However, it is a long way from
Prattsville, Alabama or Shaw, Mississippi to Chicago or New York.
These and other metropolitan areas are no more "localities" than
many state governments in terms of their fiscal expenditures and
services offered. 102 Furthermore, the major metropolitan areas have
increasingly been supplied with revenue from the state and federal
levels of government. °3 Correspondingly, the major cities have in-
creasingly yielded their local control to higher levels of govern-
ment.'04
100. 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), reh. en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972).
101. 309 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
102. In Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 381 (1975) (mem.)
the court found that the Wilmington School District limits have "frequently been disre-
garded" and were not "meaningfully separate and autonomous" as evidenced by the state
legislature's subsidizing inter-district transportation of private and parochial as well as public
school students across the Wilmington district lines. Id. at 436.
103. Intergovernmental revenues received from the federal government by state and local
governments increased from almost zero in 1902 to almost 20 percent as a portion of their
total revenue. In 1972, state and federal revenue received by municipalities comprised 25
percent of their total revenue. 3 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, VOL.
6. No. 5, GRAPHIC SUMMARY OF THE 1972 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS 25, 48 (1972).
104. At this writing it is impossible to suggest where the high water mark of state and
federal takeover of municipal government will be found. Certainly the present fiscal crisis in
New York City may be a prelude to a new era of state boards monitoring fiscal power of
municipalities, federal guaranteed loans, or even municipal bankruptcy, as the unabated
deterioration of central cities makes internally financed municipal services increasingly diffi-
cult.
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The theory of equal delivery itself focuses on the real abuses of
state action which may call for a court's strict scrutiny. By provid-
ing a workable method to identify suspect classifications and signifi-
cant infringements in the exercise of a constitutional right, the
theory discounts the credibility of local control in the light of the
current crises in urban America.

